Abstract. The purpose of the paper is to outline an analytical framework which captures the ample scope of locational competition: cost differences, resulting from differences in factor prices including taxes, human capital, infrastructure services and total factor productivity. If cost differences are small, locational competition controls excessive government power. We have modeled locational competition by assuming that governments have a vital interest to keep mobile factors of production at home. We represent this aspect by restricting the usage of environmental instruments such that they will at most exhaust the cost difference to a competing foreign firm. If cost differences are large enough there is no binding restriction for the cost-benefit calculus of a national environmental policy. The tax will be below marginal damage due to strategic reasons of rent shifting. If small international cost differences do not allow taxation in accordance with marginal damage considerations, then locational competition restricts the size of the tax rate such that the firm is indifferent in relocating or staying at home.
Introduction
It is argued in the literature that differences in environmental regulations are an important factor in industrial location (industrial flight hypothesis). This hypothesis is derived from an extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of comparative advantage. Since companies can avoid regulations by locating abroad, free trade erodes the independence of a country in implementing an environmental policy. This exerts a strong pressure towards lax regulation in order to signal a pollution haven to producers. Especially in the theoretical literature, multinational firms seem to base their direct foreign investment decision or plant location upon the stringency of environmental regulation in other countries (developing countries or Eastern Europe). The environmental regulation intensity is expected to be a significant determinant of competitiveness and causes industrial flight from industrialized countries. The argument is that stringent environmental standards cause high costs of production, leading to a decline in competitiveness, and ultimately in market share, jobs and investments. In countries with persistently high unemployment, threats of job losses and of plant relocation can be very powerful and helpful for opponents of a strict environmental policy.
1 However, a broad consensus has emerged in the empirical literature that regulatory differences (with some exceptions) have, at best, a negligible impact on industrial location. Studies attempting to measure the effect of environmental regulation on net exports, overall trade flows, and plant-location decisions have produced estimates that are either small or statistically insignificant. These results emerged from studies by Jaffe et al. (1995) and Adams (1997) which review the empirical evidence. 2 We therefore will specify a model which permits the option to relocate but in which governments will not set environmental taxes or standards such that firms will choose this option. In this model location decisions do not only depend on regulatory differences, but also on differences in factor prices, in the quality of the labor force, access to markets, differences in corporate taxes or in the provision of infrastructure. Governments know these factors which can affect business location decisions and they also know that it is rather unlikely that firms will move to another country for the only reason of taking advantage of relatively lax environmental standards.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce international productivity gaps into a model on relocation decisions and to show that there is plenty of room for strict regulation if countries are not too similar in terms of productivity and factor price differences. With productivity gaps between countries, it is hopeless to lure business into another country by providing low environmental standards. In our special model, governments might exploit the cost advantage of their domestic firms to a certain extent by adding an environmentally motivated regulatory burden, but they will set this burden low enough such that it will not cause firms to relocate existing plants. Therefore this model is in line with a study by Bartik (1988) who found that air and water pollution control expenditures, costs of compliance, and allowed particulate emissions all have an insignificant effect on plant location decisions. Jaffe et al. (1995) summarize the reasons why the effects of environmental regulation on location decisions may be small. First, for all but the most heavily regulated industries, the cost of complying with environmental regulation is a relatively small fraction of total cost of production. Second, labor cost differentials, energy and raw materials cost differentials and infrastructure adequacy dominate the environmental cost effect. Third, other monetary-equivalent costs or benefits like public services, unionization of a country's labor force, or agglomeration effects from the existing level of manufacturing activity in a region also affect plant location choices. Fourth, since the difference in environmental regulation in western industrial countries is not large, the incentive to relocate is small. And fifth, in case significant differences in regulatory stringency exist, firms may not exploit them. Because of environmental credibility reasons firms
